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The importance of the so-called Minsk II agreement1 has been stated many times 
by the European Union (EU), its member states, the United States (US), Ukraine and 
Russia (see Council, 2016; President of Russia, 2016; Ukrinform, 2016). On 14 March 
2016, the EU’s Foreign Affairs Council agreed to five principles that would guide 
the EU’s policy towards Russia. The first principle stressed that the ‘implementation 
of the Minsk agreement’ is a precondition ‘for any substantial change in the EU’s 
stance towards Russia’ (Council, 2016). 
Notwithstanding the fact that all actors involved pay lip service to the importance 
of the agreement and the lack of any viable alternatives, interpretations of Minsk II 
vary widely. Linas Linkevičius, the Lithuanian Minister of Foreign Affairs, eloquently 
makes this point: ‘some [EU Member States and Russia] are reading Minsk 
literally and believe it is possible to make decisions on decentralisation [and] on 
other political issues’ before any de-escalation of the conflict has been achieved 
(Gotev, 2015). Indeed, Linkevičius has dismissed Russia’s calls for a constitutional 
amendment in Ukraine and ‘special status’ for the Luhansk and Donetsk regions 
until security on the ground is improved. In his view, ‘[e]lections should take place 
after the situation improves, after the border would be under [Ukrainian] control, 
after they [the Russians] would stop the support of the separatist groups’ (emphasis 
added) (Ibid.). In a similar vein, Victoria Nuland, US Assistant Secretary of State 
for European and Eurasian Affairs, recently stated that ‘the Russian Federation 
and its proxies should not expect the Ukrainian parliament to amend the country’s 
Constitution before the implementation of [the] security provisions of the Minsk 
agreements’ (Ukraine Today, 2016).
The existence of different narratives and interpretations of Minsk II should not be 
surprising. Numerous actors have different stakes and interests. However, analysing 
different narratives allows us to better understand possible gaps related to the 
interpretation of the agreement, and to grasp the difficulties associated with its 
implementation. The following sections outline some of the main arguments that 
Russia advances in Europe regarding Ukraine and Minsk II. Subsequently, the Policy 
Brief then analyses how Ukrainian officials interpret Minsk II and what implications 
the different narratives have on the implementation of the agreement. 
Mind the Gap: interpreting the 
Minsk II Agreement
This Policy Brief is the first of a two-part 
feature that examines Russia’s ability to 
influence French, German and EU narratives 
on the Minsk II agreement and Ukraine’s 
evolving position in the international 
system. This first Policy Brief will focus 
on the competing Russian and Ukrainian 
narratives surrounding Minsk II. Thus, it 
will examine Russia’s efforts to portray 
Ukraine as a ‘failed state’ and a ‘semi-
sovereign’ subject, and to blame the West 
for provoking a ‘civil war’ in the country. 
It also outlines Ukraine’s counter-narratives 
that emphasise its sovereignty and the 
inter-state nature of its war with Russia. 
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Civil war or inter-state war?
Russian officials have repeatedly stressed that the West is to blame for the Ukraine 
crisis. According to their reasoning, the US and the EU aimed to artificially ‘pull 
Ukraine away’ and break the ‘brotherly’ ties that the country has had with Russia. 
As Putin put it following the annexation of Crimea: ‘we understand that these 
actions were aimed against Ukraine and Russia and against Eurasian integration’ 
(President of Russia, 2014). He went on to argue that ‘with Ukraine, our western 
partners have crossed the line […] acting irresponsibly and unprofessionally’ 
(Ibid.). Russian officials have thus reinforced the characterisation of Ukraine as 
an object divorced from its independence; a sort of ‘semi-sovereign’ country, 
and a ‘terrain’ of great power competition.  While speaking at the 2016 Munich 
Security Conference, Dmitry Medvedev, Russian Prime Minister, echoed Putin’s 
zero-sum approach towards Ukraine when concluding that ‘we have slid back 
to a new Cold War’ (Medvedev, 2016). This ‘Cold War’ narrative brings back 
memories of the ‘big power’ stand-off, which in turn reinforces the image of 
the Soviet Union and, by extension, the Russian Federation as one of the major 
global powers to be reckoned with.
Russia’s characterisation of Ukraine as an ‘object’ of and ‘terrain’ for great 
power competition also reinforces the narrative of Ukraine as a ‘failed state’. 
This reasoning is illustrated rather eloquently by Russia Today’s (RT) article that 
argues that Ukraine simply went from being ‘a country with few socio-economic 
and political problems’ to becoming ‘a failed state torn by civil war and sectarian 
violence, with a lack of constitutional order and a destroyed economy’ (Russia 
Today, 2014). This is also consistent with the image of Ukraine as an ‘artificial’ 
state, something which Putin reportedly argued in private remarks at the 2008 
NATO Bucharest Summit (Gil, 2015).  
The narrative about Ukraine being a ‘failed’ and ‘artificial’ state is instrumental 
in cementing the notion that Russia enjoys a sort of ‘property right’ over Kyiv’s 
destiny. As the story goes, Russia and Ukraine are linked by historical and cultural 
ties, which explains why Russia has a much better understanding of the country 
and the region than its Western counterparts. As Putin argued in the speech 
following Crimea’s annexation: 
‘it pains our hearts to see what is happening in Ukraine at the moment, see 
the people’s suffering and their uncertainty about how to get through today 
and what awaits them tomorrow. Our concerns are understandable because 
we are not simply close neighbours but, as I have said many times already, 
we are one people. Kiev is the mother of Russian cities. Ancient Rus is our 
common source and we cannot live without each other.’ (President of Russia, 
2014)  
This narrative twist allows Russia to both deny Ukraine the status of an 
independent state and to position itself as a ‘natural mediator’ in the Ukraine 
crisis. Russian officials argue that they understand Ukraine’s complexity better 
than anyone, and can therefore help to fix the many ‘mistakes’ that the West 
has made by ‘meddling in Ukraine’. By arguing that Ukraine is experiencing a 
‘civil war’, Russia positions itself as a peace mediator and it therefore seeks to 
bring different parties together around a ‘peace process’. In turn, the narrative 
of ‘ending the civil war’ in Ukraine explains Russia’s own interpretation of the 
Minsk II agreement. The primary aim of the post-civil war peace agreements is to 
include different parties in the political process, constitutional changes, elections 
and other internal matters. This story-line allows the Russian government to 
shift the blame for the outcome of the Minsk II peace process on to Ukraine. Put 
bluntly, Russia argues that Ukraine is guilty for not implementing the 11th point 
of the agreement which stipulates ‘…a new constitution entering into force 
by the end of 2015 providing for decentralization as a key element’ (Financial 
Times, 2015). The Russian position, as stated by the Deputy Foreign Minister, 
Grigory Karasin, emphasises that ‘Ukrainian control over the corresponding part 
of the Ukrainian-Russian border may be restored only after the completion of 
[a] comprehensive settlement of the crisis’ (TASS, 2016). In turn, this step entails 
the necessity ‘to coordinate details with representatives of Donetsk and Lugansk 
in the framework of the Contact Group of measures envisaged by the law “On 
special order of local government in certain districts of Donetsk and Lugansk 
regions” ’ (Ibid.). 
By portraying its own role as one of a ‘mediator’ rather than a ‘party to the 
conflict’, Russia can steer the discussion away from its own responsibility for 
breaking fundamental international norms that govern war and the treatment 
of prisoners of war (see Kommersant.ru, 2016).  Having pleaded for the 
‘immediate release of Nadiya Savchenko’, who is treated by Ukraine and the 
West as a political prisoner, the EU has denounced Russia’s actions (EEAS, 2016). 
Savchenko was reportedly captured by Russian forces in Ukraine and brought 
to trial in Russia. The EU has insisted that Savchenko’s release should be part of 
‘the “Package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk Agreements” and 
the commitments therein to release all hostages and illegally detained persons 
related to the conflict in eastern Ukraine’ (Ibid.). US Vice President Joe Biden 
also argued that Savchenko’s ‘unlawful continuing detention is a clear violation 
of Russia’s commitment under the Minsk agreements’ (The White House, 2016). 
However, Russia quickly rebutted such demands by arguing that Savchenko’s 
case is not related to Minsk. (see Russia Today, 2016; UNIAN, 2015). In fact, 
Maria Zakharova, the Russian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson, explained that 
‘Russia is not a party to the Minsk Agreements. These agreements only concern 
two sides that are part of the conflict’ (UAWIRE, 2016).
Kyiv’s counter-narrative: a war for independence 
For Ukraine, the Minsk agreement was concluded out of necessity in order to 
end an inter-state conflict (not a civil war) with Russia. In response to Russia’s 
ongoing claims about the Ukrainian ‘civil war’, President Poroshenko stated: ‘Mr. 
Putin, this is not a civil war in Ukraine, this is your aggression’ (Poroshenko, 
2016) According to Kyiv, efforts to pull Ukraine closer to the EU, shared by 
most political parties, reflected both the need to assert Ukrainian statehood 
and balance against ongoing political pressures from Russia. In this regard, the 
annexation of Crimea and the subsequent war in the east have been interpreted 
as existential threats, i.e. threats to the very existence of the Ukrainian state. 
Therefore, this has been portrayed in Kyiv as a war of necessity, rather than one 
of choice. 
Admittedly, Kyiv understands the need to put an end to the ongoing inter-
state war – and also that any efforts to reach a sustainable peace will require 
restoring some degree of trust with Russia. Regaining control of the borders, 
withdrawing its military and equipment, establishing demilitarised zones and 
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granting access to international monitors are some of the basic elements 
needed for trust and peace agreements to work. The lack of these steps from 
the Russian side is perceived in Ukraine with tremendous suspicion. Regular 
Russian military exercises near the Ukrainian border – planned only a few days 
before the Normandy meetings were convened to discuss the Minsk process – 
plant even more seeds of distrust about Russia’s intentions (Novosti Donbassa, 
2016). In a recent New York Times interview, Oksana Syroyid, the speaker of the 
Ukrainian parliament, has reiterated a common argument shared by many other 
deputies who do not support the agreement, i.e. that ‘Russia wants to destabilize 
Ukraine’ and that ‘paragraph 11 of the Minsk agreement is an instrument just 
like the war’ (Kramer, 2016). In her view, Minsk is not about the ‘resolution of the 
conflict’ but about ‘destabilizing Ukraine’ (Ibid.). 
Ukrainian politicians and analysts are quick to recall that while the ceasefire 
was being agreed upon Ukraine continued to suffer heavy military loses, 
particularly during the rebels’ seizure of Debaltseve. Ukrainian soldiers had to 
leave Debaltseve just three days after the Minsk II agreement was reached even 
after 179 soldiers were killed, 110 captured and 81 went missing (Kramer, 2016). 
Thus, from the outset, Ukraine viewed the Minsk agreement as a temporary 
preventative measure against further advances by the Russian-backed military. 
Ukrainian analysts and many deputies still argue that the Minsk II agreement 
demonstrates changes in Russian tactics rather than an overall strategy. Thus, 
without signs of a genuine commitment from Russia to rescind its support for 
armed groups in self-proclaimed Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) and Luhansk 
People’s Republic (LNR), support for granting ‘special status’ wanes. There is also 
an often-mentioned realisation that political agreements like the 1994 Budapest 
Memorandum2 are not to be fully trusted. 
Such arguments resonate with a large portion of Ukrainian society that is 
opposed to the implementation of Minsk II. As Tymofiy Mylovanov, president of 
the Kyiv School of Economics, remarked to the NYT: ‘it’s a difficult process not 
because of Syroyid per se, but because the Ukrainian public doesn’t accept it’ 
(Kramer, 2016). While most Ukrainians do not want the war to continue, many 
people do not believe that the Minsk process will bring about peace. According 
to a September 2015 poll conducted by the Kyiv International Institute of 
Sociology, only 26.9 percent of those polled believed that the implementation 
of the Minsk agreement can lead to peace in Donbas, against over 60.7 percent 
who did not (ZN.UA, 2015). The tensions were evident on 31 August when the 
Verkhovna Rada (the Ukrainian parliament) voted in the first reading for the 
decentralisation package that could allow for the granting of ‘special status’ 
for rebel-controlled territories. The vote in favour resulted in violent clashes 
near the Verkhovna Rada, causing fatalities (BBC, 2015). While decentralisation 
itself was not controversial, and was actually supported by politicians and the 
general public, it was the granting of ‘special status’ to the DNR and LNR that 
proved contentious. 
Economic hardship and deep disappointment with ongoing corruption contribute 
to people’s distrust of the government. This limits the government’s ability to push 
through unpopular measures. In particular, constitutional changes have been 
increasingly articulated by different parties in the parliament as ‘capitulating’ 
to Russia. With civil rights and liberties and the rule of law continuously being 
violated in DNR and LNR, this reasoning echoes the feeling that many of those 
who fought in Maidan died in vain. Both international and local humanitarian 
organisations are being denied access and expelled. There is no free media, the 
OSCE is denied full access to the region and there is no security for Ukrainian 
civil society and politicians to be able to freely partake in local elections. These 
points are some of the core arguments that are cited when debating the viability 
of the Minsk process to bring about peace (Syroid, 2016). 
The implications for Minsk’s implementation
Russia is fixated on the 11th point of the agreement that calls for Ukraine to 
make constitutional changes. The Russian focus on the process of the Minsk 
agreement rather than the overall outcome allows Russia to shield against 
possible accusations of halting peace. Arguing that different parties can be 
brought to the table, including the separatist forces, resonates with the Russian 
argument of implementing agreements that end civil wars. It is also consistent 
with Russia’s vision of its role as a ‘big power player’ mediating alongside 
Germany and France. While such tactics allow Russia to have a face-saving way 
out of the war in Ukraine, they preclude any genuine dialogue on the different 
approaches to Minsk’s implementation. Russia’s vision, promoted by its media 
at home and abroad, sharply differs from Ukraine’s interpretation. This point 
was clearly raised by Ukrainian Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin after the recent 
Normandy talks (BBC, 2016). The different approaches to managing the ‘Ukraine 
crisis’, best embodied by competing phrases such as ‘the civil war in Ukraine’ vs 
the ‘war that Ukraine is fighting’, also reveal the divergence in views about the 
nature of Ukrainian statehood.
In Ukraine, the positions of different deputies towards Minsk matter for its 
full implementation. It requires at least 300 votes out of 450 members of the 
Verkhovna Rada in order to pass the constitutional amendment stipulated in the 
agreement. However, there are some deputies who initially supported the Minsk 
process but are now losing faith in it. Others, from both the President’s and the 
Opposition blocs, may still support the agreement in order to secure Western 
support (especially in maintaining Russian sanctions), to de-escalate military 
tensions, and to gain additional electorate from these regions. But even these 
deputies still use the narrative of inter-state war. Additionally, there is also a 
powerful group in the Parliament that now rejects the Minsk agreement for 
different reasons and wants to declare ‘rebel zones occupied territory, for Russia 
to finance and feed, without a chance for integration until the Russian Army 
leaves’ (Kramer, 2016).
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Conclusions
The interpretation of the Minsk II agreement reveals divergent views about the 
nature of the conflict in Ukraine. While Russia stresses its role as a ‘mediator’ 
in Ukraine’s civil war, Ukraine interprets the crisis as an inter-state war, and 
so Minsk II is perceived as a way to stop Russian aggression. However, while 
both Russia and Ukraine argue that there is no alternative to Minsk II, the 
interpretation of the agreement points to a gap in perceptions about its 
implementation that is closely linked to their respective identities. That gap is 
much deeper than the Minsk process itself, and has widened after the collapse of 
the Soviet Union. For Ukraine, its pro-EU foreign policy is an instrument through 
which to reassert its identity as a sovereign state. Through its own interpretation 
of identity and history, Moscow sees Ukraine as a mere ‘rib’ of Russia. While 
reconciling these different visions is a much more ambitious task than the Minsk 
process, understanding them is important for the peace process. The second 
policy brief will analyse how these narratives are interpreted in Germany, France 
and more broadly across the EU. 
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